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1. Introduction 
 
The EU is one of the world’s largest markets and an important export destination for 
developing countries. Especially African countries depend on the European market and are 
greatly affected by its trade policies. Trade relations between the EU and developing countries 
have existed since the inception of the EU (and its forerunners). For a long period, the EU has 
focused on the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries alone, due to their colonial ties 
with the EU, disregarding other developing countries. However, since the mid-1990s, the ACP 
countries have faced the consequences of a shifting paradigm in the EU when it comes to trade 
policy and development (Young and Peterson 2013, 497).   
Until the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, Europe’s trade relations with the 
ACP countries were defined by the Lomé Conventions I-IV, which granted the ACP countries 
non-reciprocal access to the European market and therefore the most favourable, and 
preferential, position in comparison to the rest of the world (Ibid., 500). Since the mid-1990s, 
however, different developments contributed to a fundamental shift in Europe’s trade policies.  
When Lomé IV reached its expiration in 2000, the Commission argued that the ACP countries 
had developed unsuccessfully, despite their preferential access to the European market, and 
therefore the former trade agreement had to be renegotiated (Gibb 2000, 463).  
Secondly, Lomé IV turned out to be incompatible with the rules of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), which was created in 1995 (Kennes 2018, 4). The preferential access of 
the ACP countries to the EU namely discriminated against other developing countries that did 
not enjoy the same preferential access, simply because they had had no colonial ties with the 
EU. Therefore, the EU chose to pursue development of the poorest countries instead of the 
traditional ACP countries. 
EU enlargement also influenced this policy change, since countries such as Austria, 
Finland and Sweden (1995) had no historical ties with the ACP countries and preferred to 
develop the poorest (Young and Peterson 2013, 501). This paradigm shift was also reflected in 
institutional changes, as the Commission reallocated the responsibility for trade with the ACP 
countries from DG Development to DG Trade in 1999 (Ibid., 502). The EU and, at this point, 
79 ACP countries had to negotiate new trade relations after Lomé IV expired in 2000 (Chipaike 
2017, 368).  
The Cotonou Agreement, which entered into force in 2003, formed the basis for the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the ACP countries. The EU has been 
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negotiating EPAs, which can be seen as new free trade agreements (FTAs), with seven ACP 
regions (West Africa, Central Africa, East and Southern Africa, the Southern African 
Development Community, the East African Community, the Pacific and the Caribbean) 
(Chipaike 2017, 355). With the EPAs, the EU eliminated the preferential trade agreements 
which the ACP countries enjoyed before. Instead, the EU offered to liberalise its market to ACP 
countries for 100% and in return the ACP countries were expected to liberalise 80% of their 
markets to the EU within a time period of ten to fifteen years (Jones and Weinhardt 2015, 230).   
The ACP countries were, however, shocked by the condition of reciprocity (Kennes 
2018, 6).  Civil society in ACP countries viewed the EPAs as unfair and unacceptable. The 
dissatisfaction with the negotiations among ACP countries caused the negotiations to take much 
more time than the anticipated seven years. Only the Caribbean region signed an EPA by 2008. 
The Pacific countries were not very motivated to negotiate an EPA, since trade with the EU 
was limited and most of them are Least Developed Countries that already enjoy unilateral 
access to the European market via the Everything-but-Arms initiative (Ibid., 7). The 
negotiations with different regions in Sub-Sahara Africa also moved very slowly and only in 
2014 negotiations with three of five negotiation groups were concluded, namely ECOWAS, 
EAC and SADC (Ibid., 7). While the negotiations were concluded, some countries of the 
ECOWAS and EAC group still refused to sign or ratify the EPAs, leading to the ratification of 
interim EPAs with individual countries.  
 This research will focus on the recent trade relations between the EU and ACP countries. 
Once the EU wishes to conclude new international trade agreements, such as the controversial 
EPAs, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament have important roles, which influence the course of the negotiations. This research 
will look at the behaviour of the Commission and the EP during the negotiations of the new 
EPAs between 2002 and 2013. It will, however, not focus on the role of the Council during the 
EPA negotiations. The reason for this decision will be explained in the next section. This 
research will therefore ask the following question: 
 
How do the discourses of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
compare in the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements with the ACP 
countries? 
 
This question will be answered through a Critical Discourse Analysis of different speech acts 
from the Commission and the EP in the course of the negotiations. The literature on the power 
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identity of the EU in international relations is extensive, but speaks about the EU as if it were 
a homogenous institution. It therefore fails to distinguish the different power identities of the 
European Institutions. This research will provide an original contribution to existing literature 
by distinguishing the particular identities of the Commission and the EP in international trade 
relations, in particular during the EPA negotiations with the ACP countries.  
 In the following chapter, this thesis will explain the role of the EP and the Commission 
in the negotiation of trade agreements with third countries, after which it will discuss different 
theories about normative power Europe and market power Europe. Subsequently, chapter three 
will set out the methodology used in this thesis, the text selection and its limitations. Chapter 
four will consist of the analysis that will answer the research question of this thesis, which will 
be followed by the conclusion in chapter 5. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter explains the role of the European Parliament and the European 
Commission in the negotiation of trade agreements with third countries. Thereafter, this chapter 
discusses different theories about normative power Europe and market power Europe during 
trade negotiations which are important to understand the diverging behaviour of the EP and the 
Commission.  
 
2.1 The Council of the European Union and International Trade 
 
During external trade negotiations, the EU has as its main goal the opening of markets 
which illustrates the EU’s commitment to liberal trade policy (Nugent 2017, 388). 
Nevertheless, under pressure of the member states in the Council, the EU has also been forced 
to adopt protectionist measures. Although the EU’s trade policy favours liberalisation, it has to 
prevent possible negative consequences from free trade agreements for the member states as 
well. The negotiation of international trade deals has for a long time been the exclusive domain 
of executive powers, such as the Council of the European Union, hereafter the Council, and the 
Commission (Rosén 2018, 117). 
The Council, represents the interests of the member states (Adriaensen 2018, 99). The 
Council’s main task is to make sure that the Commission’s proposals and negotiated trade 
agreements serve the interests of all member states. Because the EU ideally speaks with a single 
voice in international trade negotiations, the Commission is allowed to negotiate on behalf of 
the member states (Ibid., 101). Before the official start of the negotiations the Council adopts a 
negotiation mandate, which indicates the goals and breaking points in the negotiations. Once 
the Council adopts the mandate, the Commission is allowed to start the negotiations. During 
the negotiations the Commission consults the Trade Policy Committee of the Council, which 
consists of representatives of the member states. At the end of the negotiations, the Commission 
forwards the negotiated agreement to the Council, who, after the EP has given its consent, 
decides to conclude the agreement (Ibid., 102). While this is the official explanation of the 
Council’s role in international trade negotiations, the balance between member states’ control 
and Commission autonomy can be affected by the degree of (dis)unity (Elgström and Larsén 
2010, 205). According to Elgström and Larsén (2010), disunity among member states and the 
relative unity of the Commission gave the Commission a high degree of autonomy during the 
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entire process of the EPA negotiations with the ACP countries (Ibid., 206). Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK were proponents of development-oriented EPAs (Ibid., 212). 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK were also in favour of completely opening up the EU market for 
ACP-exports. Furthermore, France was in favour of protecting the special relationship the EU 
has with ACP countries. On the other hand, Spain, Italy and Portugal were proponents of 
protecting certain products of the agricultural sector of the European market. These different 
preferences provided the Commission with a higher autonomy during the negotiations. Because 
the Council seemed not to be a united actor during the EPA negotiations, and only had a limited 
amount of control, as argued by Elgström and Larsén (2010), this research will only look at the 
discourses of the Commission and the EP in the course of the negotiations. 
 
2.2 The European Commission and International Trade 
 
According to Article 3 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), European 
trade policy, also called the Common Commercial Policy, falls under the exclusive competence 
of the Union (Schütze 2015, 34). Especially the Commission has an important role as the 
executive of external trade policy that carries out the negotiations of new trade agreements 
(Nilsson 2018, 79). The Commissioner for Trade is responsible for the Common Commercial 
Policy and is supported by the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) which acts as the 
administration of the Commissioner. DG Trade normally takes on the leading role within the 
Commission. However, other DGs, such as DG Development or Agriculture are involved as 
well if they have an interest (Nugent 2017, 392). According to Elgström and Larsén (2010), 
DG Trade is in strong favour of liberalisation, DG development has a liberal approach as well, 
together with a developmental focus, and DG Agriculture takes a more protectionist stance 
during trade negotiations (210). Elgström and Larsén researched the Commission’s internal 
cohesiveness during the EPA negotiations with ACP countries. In their study, they found out 
that there was a high degree of unity aside from some tensions between DG Trade and DG 
Development in the first years of the negotiations. DG Trade took the lead in the negotiations 
and DG Development had a limited role in the beginning, because the responsibility for trade 
with ACP countries had been transferred to DG Trade (Ibid., 212). Only in 2006, DG 
Development’s role became increasingly involved in the negotiations due to the increased 
attentions for development-oriented EPAs. DG Agriculture on the other hand, wanted to protect 
European farmers from agricultural competition, but was prepared to compromise since trade 
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negotiations with the ACP countries posed less of a threat than with other stronger parties (Ibid., 
220).  
As mentioned before, the EU is generally committed to a liberal trade policy and focuses 
on the opening of markets in external trade negotiations (Nugent 2017, 388). While the Council 
can deviate from this liberalisation goal when the interests of individual member states are at 
play, the Commission, specifically the Commissioner for Trade, who takes the lead in trade 
negotiations, seems to be predominantly preoccupied with the pursuit of liberalisation (De Ville 
and Orbie 2013, 162).  
 
2.3 The European Parliament and International Trade 
 
Both the Council and the Commission have been cautious to involve the EP in trade. 
Even though involving the EP in the conclusion of international agreements would increase 
legitimacy, since the EP is the only directly elected institution of the EU, it has for a long time 
been the domain of national and European technocrats (Ibid., 117). Over the years, however, 
trade policy also began to cover politically sensitive issues which instigated the demands to 
include the EP in the area of trade. The powers of the EP were finally expanded with the Lisbon 
Treaty which entered into force in 2009.  
Today, external trade policy falls under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure which 
means that the EP has been given the power to co-legislate with the Council when the 
Commission proposes new legislation (Ibid., 118). In addition, the EP has been given consent 
powers for every new trade agreement and must be informed by the Commission during the 
process of the negotiations. According to Rosén (2018), legitimacy concerns existed long 
before the Lisbon Treaty and were already an important reason for Trade Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy (1999-2004) and the Commission to propose an increase of the EP’s powers in the EU’s 
trade policy decision-making (121). Under the leadership of Pascal Lamy, the Commission 
became more wary of legitimacy concerns and wanted to avoid a conflict with the EP on this 
issue. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission already chose to report 
regularly to the EP on international trade agreements without any obligation to do so. Therefore, 
the Commission started to involve the EP more than was necessary according to the Treaties 
(Ibid., 121).  
The Lisbon Treaty finally gave the EP official powers within the realm of Europe’s 
international trade policy, which means that from thereon the EP co-decides on trade legislation, 
has the right to veto international trade agreements and the right to be informed during the 
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negotiation process (Ibid., 122). According to Nugent (2017), the EP has used its new powers 
since the Lisbon Treaty to the maximum, such as with the trade agreements with Colombia and 
Peru in 2010 whereby the EP demanded human rights, labour rights and environmental 
protection to be added into the trade agreements (391). Much in the same way, the EP 
committed itself to protecting labour, environmental and other welfare standards during the 
TTIP negotiations which started in 2013 (Schulz 2015). Moreover, Crespy (2014) found that 
the Commission is responsive to the contestation of the EP when it comes to trade policies, 
which in turn opens discursive spaces for debating public policy (182). Before the conclusion 
of a trade deal, the EP clearly tries to make sure that certain norms are upheld to protect the 
rights of European and non-European citizens by holding the Commission accountable. 
Defending these standards seems to be the EP’s first objective before pursuing further trade 
liberalisation. 
 
2.4 The Diplomatic Role of the European Parliament 
 
The EP is divided into different groups of MEPs with an array of roles. It has a 
diplomatic role through its standing committees, delegations and assemblies (Delputte, Fasone 
and Longo 2016). The EP consists of three full committees and two subcommittees with a focus 
on external action (European Parliament n.d.). Specifically, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(AFET), the Committee for International Trade (INTA) and the Committee on Development 
(DEVE) play important roles regarding external policies and therefore work closely with the 
EP delegations. Sicurelli (2010) found that both INTA and DEVE have expressed their 
concerns contrary to the position of DG Trade in regards to the EPAs after the interim EPAs 
were presented to the EP in 2007 and 2008 (107). According to INTA, the EPAs were not 
sufficiently development-oriented. DEVE, in its turn, disapproved of the hasty demand for 
reciprocity which, according to them, could have seriously negative impacts on the ACP 
economies.  
Delegations hold an important role as EP diplomats and maintain close relations with 
parliaments of non-EU countries, regions and organisations (European Parliament n.d.). The 
general aim of delegations is described as to maintain and enhance contacts with foreign 
parliaments and to promote the values of the EU. Delegations can participate in inter-
parliamentary delegations, in joint parliamentary committees, and in multilateral assemblies, 
such as the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) (Nugent 2017, 221).  
s1566474 
 12 
According to Delputte et al. (2016), the inter-parliamentary assemblies wherein MEPs 
participate, illustrate “the clearest institutional sign of the European Parliament’s external 
action” (161). The delegations choose topics to discuss which are based on the importance for 
both groups of countries and appoint two co-rapporteurs. These rapporteurs work together and 
formulate a report that is debated in economic and political committees. Following the report 
and debate, resolutions may be adopted.  
Delputte et al. researched the involvement of the EP in the EU’s partnership with the 
ACP countries through the JPA and concluded that the different understanding of development 
between the EU and ACP countries in the EPA negotiations was an important controversy 
(Delputte, Fasone and Longo 2016, 178). Moreover, the JPA became an important forum where 
ACP and EU parliamentarians met with NGO representatives to discuss the impact of EPAs on 
ACP countries. In its statements and declarations, the JPA urged a stronger focus on 
development within the negotiations and that the Commission should moderate its stance as it 
had been critiqued for pressuring ACP countries to sign the EPA (Ibid., 178). The work of the 
JPA influenced the EP as well, as the EPAs became a discussion topic during plenary sessions 
and led to a resolution specifically on the development impact of EPAs in 2009. This shows 
that, as argued by Delputte et al. (2016), the JPA has a role in “improving parliamentary scrutiny 
towards the executives of the partnership” (173). According to Pace and Stavridis (2010), 
“parliaments are expected to act as “moral tribunes” in international affairs” and can punish 
both their own governments and third country governments, since a balance of norms and 
interests is what ultimately safeguards a democracy (97). This behaviour adds a normative 
dimension to international affairs where parliaments take on an ethical role. The critique on the 
Commission for pressuring ACP countries during the EPA negotiations and the different 
positions between the ACP countries and the Commission on the development dimension of 
the EPAs, illustrates why it is important that the EP can hold the Commission accountable in 
negotiating new trade agreements.  
 
2.5 What kind of power is the European Union? 
 
Maull (2005) has tried to analyse the particular European power identity in international 
relations through François Duchêne’s concept of “civilian power Europe” which dates back to 
1972 (778).  Since the end of the Cold War, Europe no longer fulfils the role of “junior partner” 
to the US, but has taken an alternative identity in the global order (Ibid., 776). Maull argues 
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that in an ideal setting a “civilian power Europe” would simply “strive to ‘civilise’ relations 
between states along the lines of their own, democratic, domestic politics” (Ibid., 779). In this 
effort, civilian powers such as the EU would be reluctant to use military power to civilise the 
world (Ibid., 781). Instead, the EU has been a promotor of democracy, good governance and 
respect for human rights when it tried to influence other actors since the 1990s (Ibid., 785).  
Manners (2002) coined the concept of “normative power Europe” and argued, much in 
the same way, that the EU defines what is ‘normal’ in world politics (253). This stands in close 
relation to the idea of ‘civilian power Europe’. When Manners introduced this concept, he 
referred to Europe’s aim of being a “changer of norms in the international system” and even 
having the “willingness to impinge on state sovereignty” to accomplish this (Manners 2002, 
252). Manners (2002), however, rejects the idea of European norms being “cultural imperialism 
in disguise” and states that there are no material gains when the EU intervenes based on norms 
(253). Sicurelli (2016) argues that the EU indeed plays a distinctive role as normative power in 
world politics and uses soft power tools such as development aid to spread its norms (192). The 
European values and norms which Sicurelli refers to as “widely considered legitimate” are 
“economic liberalism, multilateralism, universality of human rights, liberal democracy, 
solidarity and sustainable development” (193-197). 
The EU’s attempts and successes in exporting its norms to other countries does not, 
however, necessarily mean that its norms are always considered legitimate by the receiving 
side. We should, therefore, not ignore the fact that this normative behaviour can be deemed 
unwelcome and sometimes perceived as paternalistic. Since the 1990s the EU has been a 
promoter of norms which has also been evident in areas such as trade (Sicurelli 2016, 194). 
Every preferential trade agreement from this period onwards included norms such as human 
rights and sustainable development. According to Zimelis (2011), the EU was the first entity 
that used political conditionality in its foreign policy (389). Lomé IV was one of the first 
multilateral agreements that included, besides trade and aid, political conditions such as respect 
for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In addition, it included a legal mechanism that 
enacted a consultation procedure and enabled to suspend aid when the conditions were violated. 
This illustrates that next to promoting norms, a coercive style of economic conditioning, and 
thus the use of Europe’s market power, has been a necessary tool to convince other countries 
to comply with its values. 
Pollack (2016), on the other hand, provides a more nuanced view on the EU as an actor 
in foreign affairs and states that the notion of “normative power Europe is a platonic ideal” 
(203). He argues that this concept has created the impression that the EU is a unique 
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organisation promoting good values in contrast to other powers, such as the United States who 
supposedly have no ideal of imposing values and have a realist stance towards foreign relations 
(Pollack 2016, 198). Pollack reminds the reader that it is tempting to see the EU as a unique 
normative actor because it tends to repeat these norms in all its policies and treaties (Ibid., 200). 
On the other hand, it is too simplistic to claim that these normative statements are masking its 
true motives. Pollack states that Europe’s normative foreign policy should not be reduced to 
hidden material interests, but that we certainly can detect mixed motives and also inconsistency 
in its behaviour (Ibid., 200). While discussing normative power Europe, Pollack does not 
entirely reject the idea of the EU trying to be normative, but he reminds the reader of the 
presence of European self-interests in foreign affairs.  
Damro (2012) in turn, argues that while the idea of a normative power Europe might 
seem attractive to describe what kind of power the Union is, the EU, in essence, is a market, 
and therefore “it may be best to conceive of the EU as a market power Europe (MPE)” (682). 
The EU’s primary focus has, since the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), been based on market integration. This became even clearer with the Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1986 that established the single market and created a “collective economic 
weight” (Ibid., 685). According to Damro, the combination of three characteristics, namely the 
EU’s market size, its institutional features and interest group contestation within the Union 
drive Europe to act as MPE (Ibid., 689). The EU is an economic winner when we consider that 
it is the most industrialised market and biggest trading bloc in the world. This leading market 
position enables the EU to influence the world market by externalizing its regulatory standards 
(Ibid., 686). A large market, such as the EU, will according to its size, intentionally or 
unintentionally, incentivise other countries outside the Union to change their regulatory 
standards instead of changing its own (Ibid., 687). The EU’s efforts to externalise its economic 
policies and regulatory standards are mostly intentional, but unintentional externalisation of EU 
standards happens as well simply because adoption to EU standards can be attractive to those 
who want access to the EU’s large market (Ibid., 690).  
Nevertheless, the EU can use “economic coercion” to force others to change their 
regulatory standards and threaten those who oppose “complete or partial market closure” (Ibid., 
687). While Damro emphasises this predominantly neo-liberal and capitalist identity of the EU, 
he also acknowledges the fact that the EU projects norms and therefore has normative 
characteristics. Nonetheless, the EU has since the mid-1990s embraced neoliberal trade which 
has dominated international trade discourse (De Ville and Orbie 2013, 151). Europe started to 
embrace free trade and to a large extent reject protectionism, except for its agriculture. This 
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image of Europe fits within the definition of neoliberalism which according to De Ville and 
Orbie (2013) recommends that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (151). With regards to trade, the 
neoliberal state aims to open up markets. In their critical discourse analysis, De Ville and Orbie 
(2013) analysed the Commission’s trade discourse during the global and Eurozone crisis (162). 
Their findings illustrate that the Commission appears to have a tendency to promote and protect 
neoliberalism and that it leaves no room for deviating trade policy options. This discourse of 
neoliberalism having no alternative seems to leave little space for contestation which ensured 
the persistence of neoliberalism after the crisis (De Ville and Orbie 2013, 163).  
Siles-Brügge (2013) comes to a similar conclusion in his constructivist analysis of EU 
trade policy, as he states that different Commissioners have internalised a neoliberal discourse 
(599). Siles-Brügge argues that trade commissioners have, since the 1990s, irrespective of their 
political backgrounds, used discursive strategies to construct the idea that trade liberalisation is 
not only desirable, but even necessary. This neoliberal discourse has, according to Siles-
Brügge, been used to legitimise the Commission’s agenda of opening markets in third countries. 
After the 2008 financial crisis, trade liberalisation remained a desirable objective despite 
protectionist pressures. The call for reciprocity was no longer ignored by DG Trade without 
however, deviating from its neoliberal aspirations (Ibid., 606). Reciprocity therefore became a 
tool that increases the Commission’s leverage in trade negotiations and its attempts of opening 
markets in third countries (Ibid., 612). Using this tool was still problematic, since all of the 
EU’s emerging trade partners fall under the General System of Preferences (GSP) which gives 
them market access to the EU without any obligation to offer reciprocal market access. 
According to Siles-Brügge the 2012 reform of the GSP has to be seen in this light, as it excludes 
high-income and upper-middle-income developing countries from the GSP. Even though the 
Commission explains that the GSP reform is necessary to focus on the poorest countries, Siles-
Brügge questions these moral aims since the Commission is also trying to negotiate reciprocal 
EPAs with Least Developed Countries (Ibid., 607).  
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The Approach to a Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
This thesis conducts qualitative research and adopts a constructivist approach which is 
based on an ontological position that claims that social meaning is constantly constructed by 
social actors (Bryman 2012, 33). The data in this research will therefore be subjected to a 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which is linked to constructivism, as it investigates versions 
of reality that are constructed by social actors (Ibid., 529). CDA aims, in addition, to explore 
why some versions of reality are taken for granted and other versions become marginalised 
(Ibid., 538). According to Holt (2011), the advantage of constructivist methodologies, such as 
CDA, “is that they won’t let us take for granted alleged ‘truths’ about the world” (67). Holt 
argues that discourse analysts are tasked to question these ‘truths’ which as a result helps them 
seeing these truths as one of the many possible truths and eventually helps them consider 
alternative truths in the world.  
Thus, to answer the research question to what extent the Commission and the EP have 
influenced the EPA negotiations with the ACP countries, this research conducts a CDA by 
analysing the discourses of the Commission and the EP who, according to this methodological 
approach, “seek to accomplish things when they talk or when they write” (Bryman 2012, 529).  
CDA is a way to illustrate social and political inequalities constructed by discourse (Wooffitt 
2011, 138). According to Wooffitt (2011), the way people talk and write about the world 
represents ideological assumptions and therefore reflects existing power relations (140). In 
other words, ideologies are presented as truths by influential groups in a society. Pierce (2011) 
summarises this simply by stating that “language is political” (282). This theory on discourse 
and ideology stems from Foucault’s ideas about power and knowledge. Foucault was one of 
the leading theorists who was interested in how we can uncover ideologies that sustain 
inequality through discourse (Klages 2006, 142).  
 
3.2 How to Conduct Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
According to Willig (2013), a discourse analyst seeks to identify “significant patterns 
of consistency and variation” in a text (346). When approaching the discourse of a text, it is 
therefore useful to have a couple of questions in mind and interrogate both each line of the text 
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as well as the text as a whole (Ibid., 346). Willig (2013) proposes the following questions to 
approach a text with:  
 
i. What sort of assumptions (about the world, about people) appear to underpin 
what is being said and how it is being said? 
ii. Could what is being said have been said differently without fundamentally 
changing the meaning of what is being said? If so, how? 
iii. What may be the potential consequences of the discourses that are used for those 
who are positioned by them, in terms of both their subjective experience and 
their ability to act in the world? 
 (Willig 2013, 346) 
 
These questions will be used in this research. However, because there is not one specific 
framework for conducting a CDA and because it is desirable to include different perspectives, 
this research will include supplementary tools for carrying out a CDA. These tools, that have 
been proposed by two other prominent CDA theorists, and which are widely used and 
complementary, are presented below. 
According to Machin and Mayr (2012), a basic manner to carry out CDA is through a 
lexical analysis of the text by simply asking what vocabulary the author uses and if the author 
tends to use certain words and avoid others (30). The choice of the author’s words indicates 
certain identities, values or underlying beliefs which are not always made explicit in a text 
(Ibid., 30). Studying the word content of a text can therefore reveal these implicit meanings. In 
addition to the questions above, this research will conduct CDA on the basis of the following 
questions: “What kind of words are used?” and “Is there a predominance of particular kinds of 
words?” (Ibid., 32). According to Machin and Mayr (2012), this process is useful because the 
author has chosen to use a certain language in a text based on a certain motivation. Machin and 
Mayr (2012) give one example through three slightly different news headlines, namely “youths 
attack local building”, “youths attack local addresses”, and “youths attack local family homes” 
(Ibid., 32). The last sentence sounds more serious and tends to provoke greater rejection than 
the former two because of the word ‘family’, which is considered to be more sacred than the 
words ‘building’ and ‘addresses’. Hence, without being explicit about the immoral behaviour 
of youths, the text producer has formed a sentence that indicates immorality by using the word 
‘family’ which is associated with certain values.  
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A second way of conducting an analysis of a text is over-lexicalisation which indicates 
that something is ideologically contested (Ibid., 37). Machin and Mayr illustrate this by giving 
two basic examples, namely “male nurse”, and “female doctor”. The author of these examples 
finds it necessary to give job titles a gender because it deviates from the social norm and 
therefore dominant ideology. In the same way, enemies can be over-lexicalised which creates 
anxiety and can serve as a means to justify aggressions towards an enemy.  
A third way of CDA is by asking what is missing in a text that we could have expected 
to be included (Ibid., 37). If something we would have expected in a text is excluded, we could 
ask why the text producer wanted us not to think of a particular subject. 
A fourth way of critically analysing a text is by looking for structural oppositions (Ibid., 
39). According to Machin and Mayr, we should think of oppositions such as “young-old”, 
“good-bad”, and “democracy-communism”. A text can also mention opposites less explicit by 
only mentioning one of these and leaving out the opposite word. However, this can still imply 
that the mentioned one has different qualities than the non-mentioned opposite. When for 
example someone in a text is described as an “extremist”, we imagine that an extremist acts in 
an opposite way than a “citizen” (Ibid., 39).  Machin and Mayr argue that we can talk of 
“ideological squaring” when oppositions are overtly included in a text.  
In conclusion, when carrying out a CDA of the discourse of both the Commission and 
the EP, this research will include Willig’s questions for approaching a text and Machin’s and 
Mayr’s four tools, namely a lexical analysis of the text, over-lexicalisation or excessive 
descriptions, lexical absence and structural oppositions. By asking questions while reading the 
text as a whole, I will select noteworthy sections and subject them to critical analysis in order 
to answer the main question of this thesis. 
   
3.3 Text Selection 
 
For this research, a selection of 13 representative speech acts by the Commission and 
the EP are analysed from the years 2002, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2013. All these years represent 
important junctures in EU-ACP relations. 
Section 4.1 discusses the year 2002, an important year as it represents the start of the 
EPA negotiations with ACP countries. For this year a press release from the Commissioner for 
Trade, an EP report and the ensuing EP resolution and, lastly, a speech from the Commissioner 
for Development and Humanitarian Aid are analysed.  
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Section 4.2 discusses the year 2006, the year before the WTO waiver expired, and the 
year 2007, the expected year for the conclusion of the EPA negotiations. A waiver was granted 
to the EU by the WTO at the start of the negotiations to maintain the unilateral preferential 
trade preferences to ACP countries until the expected conclusion of the negotiations in 2007. 
In this section, a speech from the Commissioner for Trade, a resolution from the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly, an EP report and the ensuing EP debate are analysed.  
Section 4.3 discusses the year 2009, which is a significant year because the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force in this year and increased the EP’s powers in trade negotiations. This 
section analyses an EP resolution, a resolution from the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
and the ensuing reaction by the Commission.  
Section 4.4 discusses the year 2013, the last year of the negotiations, in which a report 
for the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, an EP press release and lastly a speech from 
the Commissioner for Trade are analysed. 
 
3.4 Limitations 
 
As we have seen, discourse analysis is based on the idea that people do not express truth 
by using language, but use language to express how they wish the world would be (Carver 
2002, 50). The discourse analyst is not neutral when analysing texts, since the analyst does not 
stand outside of these discourses (Ibid., 51). It is therefore increasingly difficult for the analyst 
to carry out CDA when she/he agrees with the ideas in a text since these reflect her/his own 
ideology of the world (Machin and Mayr 2012, 47). An important criticism to qualitative 
research such as this one is therefore that it might be too subjective and difficult to replicate 
(Bryman 2012, 405). A last limitation to this research is the number of analysed documents. 
After having read more than 40 speech acts from the Commission and the EP, I have selected 
the most meaningful speech acts which are valuable to compare their discourse. Although it 
would have been desirable to include speech acts for the entire period of the EPA negotiations 
from 2002 to 2014, this would not have been feasible considering the length and time scope of 
this thesis. However, as this research analyses documents from 2002, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 
2013, and no radical shifts in positions are found throughout this period, including more 
documents is unlikely to change the overall outcome of this research.   
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4. Analysis 
 
This chapter consists of a critical discourse analysis of selected speech acts from the 
Commission and EP in 2002, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2013. All selected speech acts will be 
analysed according to Willig’s questions on assumption, phrasing and potential consequences 
of the discourse together with Machin and Mayr’s supplementary tools of lexical analysis, over-
lexicalisation, lexical, absence and structural oppositions. 
 
4.1 European Commission and European Parliament Discourse in 2002 
 
This section will analyse four successive speech acts from 2002, namely a Commission 
press release from Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, an EP report on the negotiations of EPAs 
with the ACP countries and the ensuing EP resolution and, lastly, a speech from the 
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson.  
  
4.1.1 European Commission Press Release – 9 April 2002 
 
On 9 April 2002, the Commission published a press release on the negotiation strategy 
of the new EPAs with ACP countries. In this press release, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, 
who is affiliated to the French Socialist Party, explains the significance of the EPAs from the 
Commission’s perspective.  
 
My proposal, agreed with Poul Nielson, has the unanimous backing of the College. It is 
based on our belief that the record shows past EU/ACP trade cooperation to have been 
a failure. (Lamy 2002) 
 
The first thing that stands out is his claim that the negotiating directives are agreed with Poul 
Nielson and unanimously backed by the entire Commission. Even though it seems more likely 
that DG Trade and DG Development disagree on certain issues, it is important to Lamy to 
present a united Commission at the start of the negotiations in his phrasing. By claiming this at 
the beginning of his statement he seems to be trying to leave other actors with little room for 
doubting the negotiation directives. The latter sentence is also telling wherein he states that past 
EU-ACP trade relations have been a failure. Lamy could have described past trade relations in 
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a more moderate tone, but chooses not to frame it that way. Describing past trade relations as 
being a failure is a way to indicate a structural opposition, namely to present the new agreement 
to be negotiated as a future success, or at least an agreement that will do much better. After 
calling ACP-EU trade relations to have been a failure, Lamy gives some facts on ACP-EU 
trade: 
 
The ACP countries' preferential access to the European market has not prevented either 
the erosion of their share of the EU import market from 7% in 1970 to 4% today or a 
stagnation of inward investment: the ACP countries together currently account for less 
than 2% of the EU's FDI. While the EU is not doing badly in comparative terms - it 
takes 67% of Africa's exports, as opposed to the United States' 27% - this is not enough 
to provide a basis for development. (Lamy 2002) 
 
In Lamy’s formulation, he insinuates that ACP countries have failed to use their preferential 
access in the past and that it might be better to eliminate something that does not benefit ACP 
countries. Lamy creates the impression that eliminating preferential access is not in the interest 
of the EU. As we have seen before, the new EPAs should eliminate the preferential access to 
the EU market and introduce a trade agreement based on reciprocity to abide by WTO rules, 
which is certainly in the interest of the EU. In addition, the introduction of reciprocity is not a 
logical solution to this problem of access to the European market. Instead, improving 
preferential access to the European market might be a better solution for ACP countries than 
eliminating it in its entirety. 
The comparison made by Lamy between the EU and the US is also notable. Lamy 
overtly opposes the EU and the US by comparing the amount of African exports to both 
countries. By making this unnecessary comparison whereby the EU wins from the US, Lamy 
intends to portray the EU as the best trading partner for ACP countries. By adding that this is 
still not enough for the development of ACP countries, he also creates the impression that the 
EU is not a trading partner with its own interests, but instead a benevolent trading partner with 
the best interests for ACP countries in mind.  
Later in his statement, Lamy presents the Commission’s three-pillar strategy for the new 
EPAs in which the Commission proposes a bargain to the ACP countries, namely additional 
access to the European market in exchange for “development-friendly policies” (Lamy 2002). 
By calling these policies development-friendly, the reader might ignore the fact that this 
proposal has a colonial tendency. The Commission is namely trying to determine which policies 
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are development-friendly policies. The Commission’s three-pillar strategy also calls for a “real 
commitment to regional integration processes” from the ACP countries (Lamy 2002). This 
over-lexicalisation of the ACP’s commitment indicates the Commissions doubtfulness towards 
the ACP’s commitment towards forming integrated regional communities similar to the EU.  
 In the second part of the three-pillar strategy, Lamy states that the Commission, in the 
opening up of ACP markets, will ensure flexible and asymmetrical agreements in an attempt to 
convince the unwilling ACP of the Commission’s benevolent free trade agenda. Lamy is overtly 
using a neoliberal discourse, but claims to take into account the ACPs vulnerability while the 
ACP countries are reluctant to open up their markets. This benevolent rhetoric is strengthened 
in the third part of the proposal, whereby Lamy states the Commission “intends to help the ACP 
countries derive the fullest benefit from the agreements” (Lamy 2002). Since the EPAs are trade 
agreements, it is interesting to see that the Commission claims to have no interest of its own 
but is only pursuing the development of the ACP countries. The Commission finds it important 
to mention that they are not forcing ACP countries to do anything since this will probably lead 
to allegations of neo-colonialism. Instead, the EPAs are meant to help ACP countries with their 
development. In the entire statement, Lamy tries to explain that development in ACP countries 
will be a logical consequence of trade and opening up markets along the lines suggested by the 
Commission.  
 
4.1.2 European Parliament Report – 5 September 2002  
 
On 5 September 2002, a report was drafted by two EP committees: the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation (DEVE) and the Committee on Industry, External Trade, 
Research and Energy (ITRE), which ultimately formulated the EP’s recommendations to the 
Commission on the negotiation of the EPAs with ACP countries (Boudjenah and Titley 2002). 
The President of the EP asked DEVE to draw up a report on the issue. DEVE, in its turn, 
appointed Yasmine Boudjenah as rapporteur. It is important to note here that rapporteurs are 
not neutral, since they are members of the EP. It is therefore interesting to mention that 
Boudjenah was a MEP from the European United Left/Nordic Green Left and a representative 
of the Communist Party in France, which partially explains her strong advocacy for a 
development-oriented EPA in the entire report. However, Gary Titley, a centre-left MEP from 
the Socialists and Democrats group and representative of the British Labour Party, elected by 
ITRE, was also asked to formulate his opinion on the report, which was ultimately written in a 
similar voice.  
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Finally, the report led to a resolution that was unanimously voted for by MEPs from 
across the political spectrum who expressed their concerns on the negotiations. In her 
explanatory statement, Boudjenah is surprised with the proposed solution from the Commission 
to increase free-trade with the EU by stating the following: 
 
The rapporteur finds this proposal quite astonishing, since tariff barriers to entry into 
the EU are not really an obstacle to ACP products whereas EU exports to the ACP 
countries constitute a genuine threat to their economies, to their integration on a regional 
basis and to their social cohesion. (Boudjenah and Titley 2002, 13) 
 
The first thing that stands out in this quote, is the strong resistance against the EPAs as presented 
by the Commission. Boudjenah finds the call from the Commission to increase liberalisation to 
be “quite astonishing” and a “genuine threat”. This over-lexicalisation indicates that the EP 
regards the Commission’s proposed EPAs with suspicion. According to Boudjenah, the EU 
should focus on eliminating non-tariff barriers for ACP products, since these have prevented 
ACP exports to enter the European market under the preferential agreement (Ibid., 13). 
Furthermore, she asserts that the ACP countries should be encouraged to process raw materials 
locally and enhance South-South trade to accomplish their integration objectives instead of 
continuing to export raw materials to the North (Ibid., 13). Lastly, she points to the structural 
adjustment programs from the IMF and the World Bank together with the debt burden and 
claims that these negative factors have contributed to the failure of the Lomé Conventions 
(Ibid., 14). Boudjenah seems to believe that every trade agreement should be based on “genuine 
development” and not on uncontrolled trade liberalisation which will have detrimental effects 
to ACP economies (Ibid., 14). Despite her call for a development-oriented EPA, in much the 
same vein as the Commission, Boudjenah points to the existing flaws within the proposed 
agreement and emphasises the need to research the effects of greater liberalisation to ACP 
countries before starting to put this in effect. This illustrates that the EP tries to hold the 
Commission accountable at the start of the negotiations already, and that it intends to protect 
the ACP countries by taking on an ethical role.  
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4.1.3 European Parliament Resolution – 26 September 2002 
 
On 26 September 2002, the EP adopted the final resolution based on the previous report 
in which it made recommendations to the Commission for the negotiation of EPAs. In the first 
paragraph the resolution already stipulates that: 
 
 …the purpose of the EU-ACP partnership is to promote and accelerate the economic, 
cultural and social development of the ACP countries, that economic and trade 
cooperation must be regarded as one of the means of achieving that purpose… 
(European Parliament 2002) 
 
The EP’s resolution takes an even more activist tone in favour of the ACP countries when it 
calls on the Commission and the Member States to make a “formal commitment at the start of 
the negotiations […] that no ACP state will be worse off” from a new trade agreement 
(European Parliament 2002). The resolution also takes into account the great effects reciprocal 
trade agreements could have on ACP countries by stressing that:  
 
…the principle of genuine partnership requires that account should be taken, in the 
negotiations, of levels of development and of the huge socio-economic impact which 
introducing a form of reciprocity in trade relations with the EU will have on the ACP 
countries’ embryonic industries, employment and government revenue in particular… 
(European Parliament 2002) 
 
Furthermore, the EP recognises that the EU and ACP countries have extremely 
asymmetrical economies and that it therefore prefers to see trade obstacles, such as subsidies 
for Europeans products, lifted prior to the opening up of ACP markets. Additionally, the EP 
finds it necessary to face structural obstacles such as weak local markets, before ACP countries 
start to liberalise their markets and begin a new trade system based on reciprocity (European 
Parliament 2002). The EP even promotes protectionism by stating that the only way ACP 
countries can manufacture and start to export finished products to the European market is by 
increasing trade within Africa and by introducing “specific, temporary selective protection 
measures” (European Parliament 2002). These examples illustrate that the EP does not neglect 
nor avoids speaking about the difficulties arising from such an EU-ACP trade agreement, but 
actually indicates that it shares the concerns with ACP countries who reiterate the negative 
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effects an EPA could have on their upcoming industries, on the creation of jobs and on 
governments’ revenue collected from import tariffs. We can moreover extract that the EP 
believes it to be important to guard the cohesion between the ACP countries since it warns the 
Commission and the Member States “that no obstacles should be placed in the way of the unity 
and integration processes” (European Parliament 2002). According to the Parliament, the EPAs 
should be instruments that support regional integration in ACP countries and absolutely should 
not do the contrary, as they call on the Commission and the Member States “to ensure that 
EPAs support regional integration efforts in the ACP and do not compete with or undermine 
them” (European Parliament 2002).  
 
4.1.4 European Commission Speech by Poul Nielson – 27 September 2002 
 
On 27 September 2002, Poul Nielson, Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid and affiliated to the Social Democrats in Denmark, gave a speech in Brussels 
at the first ACP-EC Ministerial Meeting on the Negotiation of Economic Partnership 
Agreements. At this meeting, he spoke to ministers and ambassadors about a “historic moment” 
for ACP countries and EU relations (Nielson 2002). According to Nielson the EPAs will have, 
if done well, “enormous development potential”. The EPAs sound very promising as he states 
the following: 
 
I would like to underline right from the start that EPAs are first and foremost an 
instrument for development of the ACP countries, an instrument to improve the 
prospects for the whole population in the ACP States. These are not empty words. They 
will have practical implications. (Nielson 2002) 
 
These benevolent words already indicate that the EPAs are wholeheartedly in the interest of the 
underdeveloped ACP countries. Nielson gives the impression that the EPAs are not in the 
material interest of the EU and that if the EU has an interest, it is only to develop the ACP 
countries.  
Afterwards, Nielson asserts that it is the first time in the ACP-EU relationship that 
“regional integration is put forward as the primary objective”, which will “maximise the impact 
of trade on development” (Nielson 2002). This speech aims to convince the listener that trade 
and development are intrinsically linked. In addition, Nielson emphasises that exporting to rich 
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countries is important to the ACP, but that market access to these countries has only benefitted 
the narrow elite rather than the wider population.  
According to Nielson, local and international trade are important to the ACP, but 
increasing regional trade is more important which can be achieved through a new trade 
agreement with the EU. Remarkably, the Development Commissioner claims that a new trade 
agreement with the EU is the answer to regional integration in the ACP States. All these 
objectives are clearly presented as being in the interest of the ACP countries and that the EU 
merely plays a facilitating role in the negotiations. Nielson promotes the EPAs as being 
developmental trade agreements whereby trade with the EU is not the primary objective. The 
following excerpt of his speech confirms this stance: 
 
Let me be 100% clear on one point. We are not trying here to force open developing 
countries markets for European exports when it does not make economic sense for 
developing countries to do so. What matters here is opening your markets to each other. 
(Nielson 2002) 
 
Similarly to the previous statement of Lamy, Nielson underlines that the Commission is not 
trying to force ACP countries to open up their markets, seemingly to prevent neocolonial 
allegations as well. The Commissioners seem to be on the same page in their speeches, as they 
equally present the EPAs as trade agreements, which will help develop ACP countries. This 
stands in contrast with Elgström and Larsén’s study, wherein they argued that DG Development 
had a limited role in the beginning of the negotiations and DG Trade was in strong favour of 
liberalisation. Before ending his speech, Nielson tries to make sure the audience does not 
perceive all what he has said as being paternalistic by making clear that “help from outsiders 
can only be effective if you yourselves are convinced and determined” (Nielson 2002). 
 
4.2 European Commission and European Parliament Discourse in 2006 and 
2007 
 
This section will analyse four successive speech acts from 2006 and 2007, namely a 
speech from Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, a resolution from the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly on the review of the negotiations, an EP report  and lastly the ensuing 
EP debate on the report.  
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4.2.1 European Commissioner Speech by Peter Mandelson – 19 October 2006 
 
On 19 October 2006, Peter Mandelson, Trade Commissioner and affiliated to the British 
Labour Party, addressed the European Socialist Party Conference on EPAs at the European 
Parliament. In his speech, a sense of anger can be discerned. According to Mandelson, the 
Commission’s benevolent intentions to link trade and development in the EPA negotiations 
have not been welcomed by everyone. Mandelson’s exasperation becomes evident in the 
following quotation: 
 
The Commission has been subjected to a fair amount of criticism over the last few 
months on EPAs. We’ve been accused of not listening. We’ve been accused of ignoring 
ACP concerns again and again. The very same people who organised this conference 
today chose to sell it to the media yesterday as a “clash” between myself and “poor 
countries”. Well, that’s an insult to the process and to the very goals we are trying to 
achieve. (Mandelson, 2006) 
 
It is clear that Mandelson does not understand why the Commission is being criticised so much 
on its negotiation tactics and rather than rebutting these critiques, he rejects them altogether.  
He will not accept the allegation that the Commission does not listen to the concerns of ACP 
countries, because this is a clear contradiction of what the EPAs should stand for. Mandelson 
uses this speech to convince his audience that the EU and ACP countries are in this together, 
and not against each other: 
 
We are partners, the ACP and the EU, not combatants. This is a partnership. There’s no 
monopoly of wisdom. There is shared experience: and a duty to listen to each other, and 
learn from each other. I’m ready to address genuine anxieties. I always have been. I’m 
ready to listen and respond to genuine concerns. I’m tired of rhetoric and bored with 
slogans, and politicians who seem to care as much about playing the gallery as they do 
about the real arguments. (Mandelson, 2006) 
 
It is noteworthy that Mandelson overtly mentions the structural opposites “partners” and 
“combatants” to convince the reader that the ACP and EU have a good relationship and the 
negotiations are proceeding in an equal and friendly manner. According to Mandelson, the EU 
holds no monopoly of wisdom and has a duty to listen and learn from the ACP countries as 
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well. Mandelson tries to uphold an idea of equality within an asymmetrical partnership. It seems 
that the Commission truly believes that it has been listening and responding to the concerns 
during the EPA negotiations. However, the Commission is accused of doing the opposite. In 
addition, Mandelson says he will not address every anxiety or concern around the EPA 
negotiations, but only those that are “genuine”.  He is also tired of listening to politicians who 
do not raise the “real” arguments. This over-lexicalisation of anxiety, concerns and arguments 
creates the impression that Mandelson and his Commission indeed hold the monopoly of 
wisdom within the negotiations, as they decide which concerns or arguments are worth listening 
to. Mandelson eventually links the Commission’s neoliberal discourse with development: 
 
The response of some is to blame globalisation and encourage ACP countries to shake 
their fists at it. Or to blame trade, as if trade is something you are exploited by, rather 
than benefit from. Yet trade drives economic growth and lifts people out of poverty. It 
is the only sustainable road to development. (Mandelson, 2006) 
 
It is noteworthy that the Commission reiterates the importance of developing the ACP countries 
with this new trade agreement and does not mention any EU interest. This seems to indicate 
that the Commission has a moral duty to help its weaker trading partners. This makes one 
wonder if the Commission really believes to behave in a different way in trade negotiations 
with developing countries, or that it is trying to mask its neoliberal intentions in its speeches to 
avoid more criticism. Subsequently, the Commissioner points out that he acknowledges the 
asymmetry between the EU and ACP countries: 
 
There obviously won’t be full reciprocity – I’ve said that. These aren’t FTAs – not in 
the way anyone understands that term. They are development tools. (Mandelson, 2006b) 
 
Again, the Commission points to the benevolent character of the negotiations and that its aim 
is to exclusively help the ACP countries with development tools instead of free trade 
agreements. Mandelson reinforces this benevolent rhetoric by explicitly using the words “help”, 
“flexibility” and “careful” in the following sentence: 
 
While we can and must set out to help open these economies within a regional customs 
union and behind a regional tariff, there will be all the flexibility appropriate for 
s1566474 
 29 
industries that need a careful transition to exposure to wider competition. (Mandelson, 
2006b) 
 
According to Mandelson, the Commission is helping the ACP countries open their markets, 
instead of forcing them. This opposition is overtly included in the text: 
 
Those who dismiss the EU's position in these negotiations as 'forcing open' these 
markets to unwanted EU investment, or accuse the EU of ‘peddling a corporate agenda’ 
not only misrepresent the EU's intentions, but are wilfully misrepresenting the economic 
evidence. The only force being applied is by those closing the door to investment that 
Africa urgently, urgently needs. (Mandelson, 2006) 
 
As in the beginning of the speech, Mandelson does not hide his annoyance against critics that 
accuse the EU of not having a benevolent agenda at all in the EPA negotiations. According to 
Mandelson, Africa “urgently” needs European investment. This over-lexicalisation of Africa’s 
urgent need of European help has a neo-colonial tone, since it indicates that Africa is extremely 
dependent of the EU for its development. Lastly, Mandelson mentions the slow progress of the 
EPA negotiations in the SADC region: 
 
In the SADC region, for example, we're disappointed by the lack of willingness so far 
to talk about these issues. In other regions, we see more openness. Again, the choice 
lies with the regions themselves. But I’m not going to shy away from the intellectual 
arguments on this. I can live with criticisms from a few NGOs if this is the price to pay 
to help genuine progressiveness and reformers in the ACP who want to put in place the 
conditions for investment and growth. (Mandelson, 2006) 
 
It is noteworthy that Mandelson first reiterates that no force is being applied and that the ACP 
regions have their own choice to go ahead or not with the negotiations. However, according to 
Mandelson, the ACP regions should go on with the negotiations as they are based on 
“intellectual” arguments. Mandelson believes that the Commission brings the correct 
arguments, which will “help genuine progressiveness”, while others are non-“intellectual” and 
unworthy of listening to. This rhetoric shows that the Commission believes it is the only 
genuine actor that is helping ACP countries develop through the liberalisation of ACP markets.  
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4.2.2 ACP-EU JPA Resolution – 23 November 2006 
 
On 23 November 2006, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution 
on the review of negotiations on EPAs. In this resolution, the JPA states that it understands the 
new EPAs are necessary to make trade relations between the ACP and the EU compatible with 
the WTO rules, but also calls on the Commission to not forget that this aim “does not take 
precedence over the overall aim of sustainable development”. This indicates that the 
parliamentarians from both ACP countries and the EU believe the Commission is prioritising 
the compatibility of WTO rules over the development aim of the EPAs in the negotiations.   
In this resolution, the JPA calls on the EU not to exert undue pressure on the ACP countries in 
the process of the negotiations and to “ensure that, in the event of negotiations not being 
completed by 1 January 2008, existing ACP exports to the EU are not disrupted until a final 
settlement is reached” (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2006). This demonstrates the 
existing concerns among ACP countries and EU MEPs that the Commission is exerting pressure 
on the ACP countries to conclude the agreements without sufficiently taking into account 
remaining concerns.  
 
4.2.3 European Parliament Report – 27 March 2007 
 
On 27 March 2007, the Committee on International Trade (INTA) released a report on 
the EPAs. Robert Sturdy, a right-wing MEP from the European Conservatives and Reformists 
Group and representative of the British Conservative Party, was the rapporteur of this report 
and tabled a motion for a resolution on the EPAs with an explanatory statement. The EP report 
served as a reminder to the Commission of the approaching negotiation deadline on 1 January 
2008, which had not advanced as they should have at this stage of the negotiations. According 
to Sturdy, the reason for this delay has been the different convictions between the negotiators: 
 
Much of the debate concerning trade and development is polarised. Years of argument 
about the merits of liberalisation and free trade have not helped negotiations advance. 
(Sturdy 2007) 
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The Commission tries to convince the ACP countries that the EPAs and the extent of trade 
liberalisation it recommends will lead to development. This has, however, not been convincing 
enough for the ACP countries who have a different perception of development: 
 
Negotiations of EPAs have been characterised by mistrust and disagreement about how 
trade should be made a "development tool". Mistakes have been made in approaches to, 
and the undertaking of, negotiations which are wide ranging and ambitious in their 
scope. The voices of those who will be affected by EPAs have not always been 
adequately heard nor the impacts of EPAs on ACP countries fully quantified. (Sturdy 
2007) 
 
Sturdy explains that the ACP countries and the Commission have different ideas about the link 
between trade and development. Delputte et al. already mentioned this problem in their article, 
wherein they argued that different understandings of development at each side of the 
negotiation table were an important controversy in the process. Sturdy mentions another 
problem, namely that the negotiations have not sufficiently taken into account the voices in 
ACP countries. The ability of these countries to act in the negotiations is limited compared to 
the Commission. It is therefore important that Sturdy acknowledges that mistakes are made by 
the European side during the negotiations:  
 
The inability of the Commission to make the "development dimension" sufficiently 
central to EPA negotiations has been a significant barrier to progress in EPA talks. The 
inability of the ACP to be detailed in what exactly it wants in the "development 
dimension" beyond uncosted requests for additional financial support has made it 
difficult for interested stakeholders to hold the Commission to account when calling for 
"pro-development EPAs". Particularly as the instruments set up to ensure that EPA 
negotiations are "pro-development" have either not worked or lacked credibility. 
(Sturdy 2007) 
 
However, Sturdy states that the ACP-side was at times also at fault, since it had not 
made clear what was missing in the development dimension except for extra funding. This is 
an interesting turn compared to the EP report of 2002, whereby the ACP were positioned as 
victims in the EPA negotiations. In this report, the EP still lays most of the blame on the 
Commission with regards to the failing negotiations, but is also critical of the ACP’s 
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involvement in the process. These problems have mainly been caused by communication 
problems between the negotiators according to Sturdy, who described the partnership as a 
“dysfunctional marriage” (Sturdy 2007). Sturdy is cautious in taking a position when discussing 
the disagreements between the ACP and the Commission. Instead of stating that the ACP 
concerns are genuine, he chooses to say that the ACP do not “believe” the development friendly 
rhetoric of the Commission, and have the “impression” that the EU is forcing FTA’s.  Sturdy 
even hinges to the benevolent character of the EU as he mentions how the EU is doing a lot 
already to support the ACP countries in their development. In contrast to the Commission’s 
discourse, however, Sturdy acknowledges the doubts of the ACP countries: 
 
The ACP is right to question whether the Commission's proposals will contribute to 
their development in the manner that they want it to and whether promises of additional 
financial assistance really are additional. However, if EPAs are to be successfully 
concluded there must be more engagement and ownership of the result of EPA 
negotiations than there has been of the process. (Sturdy 2007) 
 
In addition, Sturdy makes clear that he wishes the EPAs to be successfully concluded. This 
illustrates that the EP still believes the EPAs are desirable, even though the negotiations have 
reached a stumbling block. According to Sturdy, the EPAs need to be concluded, but cannot be 
imposed on ACP countries:  
 
While it is in no one's interests to have a forced agreement, focussing on another WTO 
waiver will not solve the underlying problems that have made progress in EPA 
negotiations so difficult from the beginning. (Sturdy 2007) 
 
Sturdy believes the EPAs should have a deadline or liberalisation schedule, but not be forced 
upon ACP countries. Again, he refers to both the responsibility of the Commission and ACP 
countries, since the Commission seems to be in a hurry and the ACP countries seem to be 
stalling the negotiations. In the end, the EPAs are meant to be development tools, according to 
Sturdy, and a forced agreement is not desirable, nor will it have the development impact that is 
aimed for.  
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4.2.4 European Parliament Debate – 23 May 2007 
 
On 23 May 2007, a resolution based on this report was adopted. Debates between MEPs 
from across the political spectrum were held on 22 and 23 May, which gives a good impression 
of their positions in the negotiations. Almost all the different MEPs who engage in the debates, 
give priority to the development dimension of the EPA instead of the opening up of the ACP 
markets, as can be seen in the examples1 below: 
 
MEPs who give priority to the development dimension of the EPAs 
 
Tokia Saïfi, on behalf of the PPE-DE group (centre-right): 
“I would emphasise this development dimension: these agreements cannot be reduced 
to mere free trade agreements under the WTO and must be instruments serving 
economic and human development. Therefore, the EPAs will also be as asymmetric 
and progressive as possible.” 
     (European Parliament 2007a) 
MEPs who point to the Commission’s use of pressure 
 
David Martin, on behalf of the PSE group (centre-left):  
“I have heard the Commissioner say in this Chamber that the European Union has no 
offensive trade objectives with ACP countries. But again, when we hear from 
negotiators, their perception is that the Commission is pushing them very hard to open 
up our services markets and to make other market-opening offers.” 
(European Parliament 2007b) 
 
MEPs who point to the EPAs as a threat for the ACP countries 
 
Vittorio Agnoletto, on behalf of the GUE/NGL group (left/far left): 
“…the economic partnership agreement negotiations as conducted by the Commission 
with the backing of the Council are threatening the economic and food sovereignty of 
the ACP countries and jeopardising any remaining possibility for these countries to 
consolidate their own productive sectors…” 
 
1 For more examples, see the Appendix. 
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(European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Similar examples can be found in the appendix. Some MEPs find meeting the deadline of the 
negotiations an equally important aim as to guarantee development, while others believe the 
Commission should find an alternative solution if the ACP countries fail to meet the deadline. 
In addition, it is noteworthy that some MEPs find the Commission to exert undue pressure on 
ACP countries during the negotiation process, while others go as far to say that EPAs form a 
threat to the ACP economies. Finally, it is interesting to note that none of the MEPs in these 
debates actively support the Commission, but rather hold it under scrutiny with regard to the 
process of the negotiations.  
 
4.3 European Commission and European Parliament Discourse in 2009 
 
This section will analyse three successive speech acts from 2009, namely an EP 
resolution, an ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly resolution and the ensuing follow-up by 
the Commission. 
 
4.3.1 European Parliament Resolution – 5 February 2009 
 
On 5 February 2009 the EP adopted a resolution on the development impact of the EPAs. In 
this resolution the EP urges the Council, the Commission, the member states and ACP countries 
“to re-establish an atmosphere of confidence and dialogue in so far as it has been damaged in 
the course of the negotiations” (European Parliament 2009). This illustrates that the 
negotiations are proceeding in a bad atmosphere, and implies that all parties have a role in this. 
In addition the EP asks the Council, the Commission and the member states “to recognise the 
ACP states as equal partners in the negotiation and implementation process”, which suggests 
that the ACP states have not been taken seriously (European Parliament 2009). Moreover, the 
EP stresses that “signing an EPA is not imposed as a precondition to receive Aid for Trade 
Funds”, clearly demonstrating its dismay on this type of conditionality (European Parliament 
2009). The EP also insists that the EPA are instruments to development and reminds the Council 
and the Commission that “neither the conclusion nor the renunciation of an EPA should lead to 
a situation where an ACP country may find itself in a less favourable position”, which shows 
that the EP tries to protect the ACP countries from EPAs that will not lead to development 
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(European Parliament 2009). Furthermore, the EP refers to regional integration efforts of ACP 
countries and states that some of the concluded EPAs “run the risk of undermining regional 
integration” (European Parliament 2009). This is an undesirable outcome according to the EP 
as it calls on the Commission to “recalibrate its approach taking account of this risk, and ensure 
that concluding EPAs does not endanger regional integration” (European Parliament 2009). 
Lastly, the EP underlines that “all agreements must respect the asymmetry in favour of the ACP 
countries regarding both the range of products targeted and the transition periods” (European 
Parliament 2009). It is clear that the EP does not worry about European interests, but is at all 
times worried about the possible negative outcomes of the EPA negotiations and tries to defend 
the interests of the ACP countries.  
 
4.3.2 ACP-EU JPA Resolution – 9 April 2009 
 
On 9 April 2009 the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution on 
EPAs and their impact on the ACP countries in Prague. This resolution, drafted by both ACP 
and EU parliamentarians, highlights the development dimension of EPAs, as has been seen in 
previous resolutions. The resolution also reminds the EU institutions that an ACP country may 
not find itself “in a less favourable positions than it was under the trade provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement” (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2009). The strong rhetoric on 
development by the ACP-EU JPA shows that the MEPs who take part in this assembly are 
driven to defend the ACP countries during the negotiations with the Commission. The ACP-
EU JPA informs the EP and tries to convince it to act in favour of the weaker ACP economies, 
as can be seen in the following recommendation of the resolution: 
 
The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly […] recommends that the European 
Parliament wait for the opinions of the ACP parliaments on the outcomes of the EPA 
negotiations wherever possible and that it take these into account before issuing its 
assent. (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2009) 
 
It is interesting to see how straightforward it seems for the ACP-EU JPA that the EP should 
also act as a representative for ACP citizens while being a European Institution that acts in the 
interest of EU citizens. While the EP did not react to this specific request by the JPA, it is safe 
to say that the JPA’s recommendations have a notable influence on the resolutions of the EP. 
The fact that MEPs form part of this assembly and that the EP has indeed defended the ACP 
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countries, as we have seen in the previous sections, shows that Pace and Stavridis (2010) were 
correct in claiming that parliaments are expected to act as moral tribunes in international affairs. 
Not only can the EP, therefore, defend the interests of the EU, but of third country governments 
as well.  
 A lexical analysis of the resolution also shows the over-lexicalisation of the ACP-EU 
JPA on the use of pressure by the Commission. This is interesting because the Commission has 
repeatedly denied that it uses any kind of pressure during the negotiations. The ACP-EU JPA, 
however, tries to make clear several times that the Commission should not impose anything on 
the ACP countries. The following text box illustrates this repetition. 
 
 
 
Jones and Weinhardt (2015) compared the issue of coercion during the EPA negotiations to the 
colonial era. They argue that power asymmetries have been prevalent because of the 
Commission’s coercive tactics. According to Jones and Weinhardt, many African politicians 
have referred to the colonial era during the EPA negotiations because the EU would have been 
coercive (235). While it is not strange that this behaviour of the Commission reminds African 
“The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly […] stresses the fact that signing an EPA is 
not imposed as a precondition for receiving Aid for Trade funds;” 
         (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2009, 5) 
 
“Urges the European Union also not to tie the release of funds under the 10th EDF or 
Aid for Trade to the signing of a full EPA;” 
        (Ibid., 5) 
 
“…opposes any kind of conditionality linked to EPAs in the matter of granting European 
aid, and calls on the Commission to guarantee that access to funds under the 10th EDF is 
kept separate from the outcome and pace of the negotiations;” 
      (Ibid., 6) 
 
“… stresses in particular the importance of reflecting the concerns of the partner countries 
and their parliaments, local authorities and civil society in the framework of the negotiations 
on full EPAs, which should not be concluded under pressure or in haste;” 
         (Ibid., 6) 
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governments of the colonial era, it is important to point to out that this situation is very different, 
since the EU is not using military power to control ACP economies, as it has done in the past, 
and because it is not surprising that the EU is using economic power during trade negotiations 
(Ibid., 238).  
In addition to the ACP-EU JPA’s emphasis on coercion within the resolution, it 
repeatedly points to the necessity of re-establishing trust in the process of the negotiations. This 
over-lexicalisation shows that the negotiations are proceeding in a bad atmosphere a year after 
the negotiations should have been concluded. This second emphasis, which can be seen in the 
text box, indeed sounds like a dysfunctional marriage, as pointed out by an MEP previously in 
this analysis.  
 
 
 
While the Commission might be convinced it acts in the best interest of the ACP countries 
during the negotiations, as we have deducted from its rhetoric before, it seems that its 
benevolent intentions have not convinced the ACP countries. Jones and Weinhardt (2015) argue 
that even when the Commission negotiators were driven by good intentions to help reduce 
poverty in the ACP countries, the Commission’s choice to ignore their concerns and its 
conviction of understanding trade policies better than its  ACP partners has led to much 
criticism from their side (Ibid., 244). The Commission would not allow ACP countries to 
“The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly […] urges the Council, the Commission and 
the governments of the EU Member States and ACP countries to do their utmost to re-
establish an atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and security insofar as this has been 
damaged in the course of the negotiations” 
        (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2009, 5) 
 
“Urges the institutions and governments of the EU Member States to do their utmost to re-
establish an atmosphere of confidence and trust in so far as it has been damaged in the 
course of the negotiations” 
         (Ibid., 7) 
 
“Highlights the need to restore trust between the ACP countries and the EU countries, 
which was shaken during the EPA negotiations, in the spirit of the partnership that binds 
them” 
        (Ibid., 8) 
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control their own trade policies which has been one of the reasons the ACP countries chose to 
stall the negotiations (Ibid., 244).  
 
4.3.3 Follow-up by the European Commission – 9 April 2009 
 
The Commission released a short statement addressing the ACP-EU JPA, in reaction to 
its resolution of 9 April 2009. It is interesting to see in this statement that the Commission does 
not explicitly deny the accusations from the ACP-EU JPA of using pressure or damaging the 
relationship between the EU and ACP countries. Instead, the Commission chooses to pretend 
nothing unusual has happened by repeating that it takes the concerns in ACP countries into 
account: 
 
The Commission has been working actively with the Council and its ACP partners to 
address ACP concerns, whether related to the substance or the process of the EPA 
negotiations.  
(European Commission 2009) 
 
The Commission reacts to the accusations of coercion as well, by repeating many times that the 
Commission will not use pressure, haste nor conditionality during the negotiation process and 
by guaranteeing that the ACP countries decide for themselves as sovereign states. This is 
illustrated in the table below. 
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The Commission has promised these conditions several times since 2002. It seems that these 
promises are worth little if the negotiating practice of the Commission has not changed since 
the beginning, as has been made clear by the ACP and MEPs. If the latter are wrong about the 
Commission’s intentions, the diverging statements of the Commission and ACP-EU JPA would 
then clearly be a matter of grave miscommunication. A last point that can be made regarding 
“The Commission remains committed to negotiating comprehensive regional EPAs tailored 
to the needs, capacity and development context of each region, including services and trade-
related issues where appropriate, but without undue pressure from the EU. This is not so 
much a question of WTO compatibility but of seeking adequate solutions for ACP 
development.” 
 (European Commission 2009) 
 
“The Commission considers that it is up to the ACP partners themselves to decide which 
type of trade-related rules they want to negotiate at this stage and to what extent.” 
 (European Commission 2009) 
 
“The Commission and its staff are, of course, ready and willing to offer support and advice 
to the ACP negotiators during the negotiating process, without undue pressure or haste. 
Whilst pointing out that this is a sovereign ACP decision, the Commission agrees that ACP 
national parliaments, local authorities and non-state actors should be involved in the 
negotiations and implementation of EPAs.” 
 (European Commission 2009) 
 
“The Commission welcomes the Joint Assembly's support to the regional Aid for Trade 
packages and fully shares the Assembly's view that Aid for Trade should not be 
conditional on signing an EPA.” 
 (European Commission 2009) 
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the text in the text box is that the Commission emphasises the independence of the ACP 
countries by pointing to their sovereignty. The ACP countries, according to the Commission, 
can make their own decisions without being pressured. This indicates that the Commission is 
decidedly trying to protect itself from neo-colonial allegations. 
 
4.4 European Commission and European Parliament Discourse in 2013 
 
This section will analyse three successive speech acts from 2013, namely a report from 
the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the process of the negotiations, an EP press 
release and lastly a speech from Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht.  
 
4.4.1 ACP-EU JPA Report – 22 February 2013 
 
On 22 February 2013, co-rapporteurs Edwin Banda from Malawi and Patrice Tirolien, 
a MEP from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and representative of the 
socialist party in France, published a report on the EPAs and the process of the negotiations on 
behalf of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. The report highlights that from the outset 
the EU and ACP “entered the negotiations with different expectations” (Banda and Tirolien 
2013). While the Commission aimed for the liberalisation of goods, investments, government 
procurement and trade in services, the ACP countries aimed for the liberalisation of goods 
alone, whereby strengthening their economic capacities for their development was considered 
a priority. This illustrates why the Commission’s neoliberal agenda presented a stumbling block 
in the negotiations and little progress was made. In 2007, many ACP countries, except for the 
CARIFORUM region where negotiations were progressing successfully, called for alternative 
solutions to the EPAs and an extension of the WTO-waiver. This led to the initialling of seven 
interim EPAs by 21 ACP countries at the end of 2007. According to the report the negotiations 
only became more complex after 2007: 
 
…the interim EPAs had been negotiated in haste under great time pressure ACP 
countries felt did not reflect their development interests and that they wanted to amend.  
        (Banda and Tirolien 2013)  
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It is notable that haste and time pressure are recurrent problems and over-lexicalised during the 
negotiations. The fact that ACP countries feel the negotiations do not reflect their development 
interests is problematic as well, since this is one of the most important aims of the EPAs.  
The report also mentions the Commission’s proposal to withdraw preferential market 
access from ACP countries that have not taken the steps to ratify the EPAs before the end of 
2013. By the end of 2007, the Council adopted Market Access Regulation (MAR) 1528/2007 
to ensure that the ACP countries that started the negotiations but had not signed nor ratified an 
EPA could still enjoy preferential market access to the EU and would not be subjected to the 
disruption of trade (European Parliament 2013, 16). However, on 30 September 2011, the 
Commission submitted a proposal to amend this regulation to withdraw the countries that had 
not taken the necessary steps towards ratifying the EPAs from 1 January 2014 on. While the 
Council supported this amendment, the EP amended the date of entry into force on 13 
September 2012 from 1 January 2014 to 1 January 2016, which in turn was not accepted by the 
Council. The ACP-EU JPA shows its dissatisfaction with the Commission’s proposal as well: 
 
The Commission’s proposal to amend MAR 1528/2007 again puts ACP countries in a 
situation where they are under pressure to accept EPAs not on their development merits. 
But to avoid the interruption of their exports to the EU. Such pressure does not sit well 
with the principles of partnership of the Cotonou Agreement. (Banda and Tirolien 2013) 
 
The ACP-EU JPA considers the amendment to be another form of pressure by the Commission 
which does not take into account the development aim of EPAs. Since the beginning of the 
negotiations, undue pressure by the Commission has been a point of criticism from both the 
ACP-EU JPA and the EP time and again. This illustrates the latter’s commitment to support the 
ACP countries and their development interests in the negotiations with the Commission.  
 
4.4.2 European Parliament Press Release – 16 April 2013 
 
In a short press release published on 16 April 2013, the EP stated that the eight ACP 
countries that were affected by the MAR 1528/2007, would have until 1 October 2014 to 
ratify the EPAs (European Parliament 2013):  
 
The deadline was extended by 9 months under pressure from Parliament and voted on 
Tuesday. (European Parliament 2013) 
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While the EP tried to amend the date to 1 January 2016, thereby extending the deadline with 
two years as we have seen before, the Council did not approve as it was in favour of 1 January 
2014, the date set by the Commission. It is therefore noteworthy that the EP accomplished to 
extend the deadline with 9 months, which again shows their commitment to help ACP countries 
in the negotiations and secure development-oriented EPAs. It is clear that the EP wishes to 
evidence its support by overtly phrasing that it used pressure to influence the deadline. MEP 
David Martin, affiliated to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, says the 
following about this: 
 
I can agree that unlimited and unconditional preferences are not a sustainable option 
and the time has come to set a deadline. At the same time, some of those ACP countries 
considered the initially proposed expiry date of 1 January 2014 to be an ultimatum to 
push them into unsatisfactory agreements. This is not a trade and development 
relationship the EU seeks to have. (Martin 2013) 
 
Indeed, the EP has not voted against the EPAs as a whole, which shows that it believes the 
EPAs are necessary. Nevertheless, it disagrees to “push” ACP countries into agreements they 
are unsatisfied with, and would damage the relationship between the ACP and the EU. This 
illustrates the important role the EP wishes to play in the negotiations, namely holding the 
Commission accountable for ignoring the ACP’s concerns and pushing an agreement without 
first securing its development goals.  
 
4.4.3 European Commissioner Speech by Karel De Gucht – 11 October 2013 
 
On 11 October 2013, Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, affiliated to the Open 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats, gave a speech to the ministers of the EU-ACP Ministerial 
Trade Committee on the state of play and future perspectives of the EPAs. During his speech, 
De Gucht was very positive about the negotiations, which is in stark contrast to what the ACP-
EU JPA and the EP had been saying: 
 
On the whole, I would say that EPA negotiations have clearly made much progress over 
recent years. In several regions, they have advanced so much that most technical issues 
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are being settled and only a handful of politically more sensitive issues remain open.
             (De Gucht 2013)  
 
It is striking that the Commission does not mention any of the concerns ACP countries have 
with the EPAs, which have been voiced by both the ACP as EU parliamentarians. The 
Commission simply chooses to ignore these existing concerns by painting a rosy picture of the 
negotiations. Instead, De Gucht starts to spell out the steps the ACP countries have to take in 
the year to come: 
 
Countries concerned have until 1 October 2014 to sign and/or ratify and implement their 
existing interim agreements and maintain their free access to the EU. Meanwhile, on-
going EPA negotiations may continue as long as they have the prospect to bear fruit. I 
take the opportunity to repeat once again that there is no deadline for EPA negotiations 
in progress since 2007. (De Gucht 2013)  
 
By stating what the deadline is for ACP countries, the Commission uses its powerful position 
which leaves ACP countries with little bargaining room. This illustrates that the Commission 
uses its market power muscle at this last stage of the negotiations, since it can decide who is 
allowed to have free market access to the EU which is more valuable for the ACP countries 
than the ACP market is to the EU. That the Commission is aware of its stronger position 
becomes clear again in the following quote, where it places ACP countries under time pressure: 
 
I want to be clear on one point: there will be no new bridging measure. The whole 
purpose of the amendment was to regularise the status of the older EPAs. […] The only 
possible third way could be a regular comprehensive free trade agreement, but in such 
a set up EU market access is far less generous than the 100% duty and quota free access 
we offer in EPAs which were specifically designed to offer the best possible trade 
conditions to less developed but justifiably ambitious economies. Growth and a stronger 
position in world markets is what you all deserve. (De Gucht 2013)  
 
The consequence of this red line from the Commission for ACP countries, is that they are left 
with little to choose from since they are the weaker trade partner. It is noteworthy that the 
Commission combines its strong rhetoric with benevolence. The Commission wants to make 
clear what the remaining options are for the ACP countries thereby seemingly deciding the 
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course of the negotiations on the one hand, but it also tries to convince the ministers that the 
offered EPAs are very generous on the other hand. By stating that these generous agreements 
are designed to offer the best trade conditions to the ACP economies and asserting that these 
agreements are all the ACP countries deserve, the Commission is trying to convince the 
ministers that the Commission only had the best interest of the ACP countries at heart all this 
time. Lastly, De Gucht reiterates why the EPAs are the best agreements offered to the ACP 
countries: 
 
We continue to see EPAs as the most promising means to use trade for growth, jobs and 
development. Openness to trade has been a key element of successful growth and 
development strategies. (De Gucht 2013)  
 
According to De Gucht, it is the use of trade and specifically trade openness that will gear ACP 
countries towards development. The Commission is convinced that free trade will have much 
development potential for the ACP countries which it regards as difficult to contest, even 
though concerns have been raised frequently by the ACP countries themselves.  
Even though this research focuses on the discourse of EU parliamentarians and 
Commissioners, it is interesting to add that several member states have disagreed with the 
Commission’s negotiation strategy, and prioritised development-oriented EPAs as well. In 
December 2012, a French delegation shared a written statement to the Council wherein it stated 
that the deadline of the EPAs was “too early” and that it agreed with the EP to set the deadline 
to 2016 (General Secretariat of the Council 2012). According to France, the ACP countries 
must be allowed “to prepare as well as possible for the entry into force of the EPAs” (General 
Secretariat of the Council 2012). A year later, on 5 December 2013, Denmark, France, Ireland 
and the Netherlands sent a joint letter to the Commission, wherein they shared their concerns 
on the EPA negotiations. The member states stated that they have always supported 
“development-oriented EPAs” and that the current situation still “raises concerns” since the 
negotiations “face significant difficulties” (Petersen, et al. 2013).   
The member states show a softer stance towards ACP countries as they are in favour of 
more flexibility, a development-friendly conclusion and to preserve trust between the EU and 
ACP countries. Elgström and Larsén (2010), as discussed before, already argued that countries 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, France and the UK were proponents of 
development-oriented EPAs while also favouring the liberalisation of trade. This shows that 
some member states place emphasis on greater flexibility by the Commission and that they 
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believe it to be desirable to value the concerns of the ACP countries over a rapid conclusion of 
the negotiations.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has applied a Critical Discourse Analysis to answer how the discourses of 
the European Parliament and the European Commission compare in the negotiations of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements with the ACP countries. 
In 2002, the Commission presented the EPAs as a future success, whilst past trade 
relations were described as a failure. Until the end of the negotiations, the Commission created 
the impression that the EPAs were in the best interest of the ACP countries and not in the 
interest of the EU. We have seen that the Commission presented itself as a benevolent partner 
with the best interests for ACP countries in mind. The Commission overtly used a neoliberal 
discourse by reiterating the advantages of trade and the opening up of markets for ACP 
countries. At the same time, however, it tried to convince the ACP partners that the Commission 
took the ACP’s vulnerability and development interests into account. We have also seen that 
the Commission tried to avoid allegations of neo-colonialism by repeatedly mentioning that it 
was not trying to force ACP countries to accept the EPAs. In 2006, when the Commission was 
subjected to a fair amount of criticism, it rejected the allegations and decided which concerns 
were worth listening to. In 2009, however, the Commission stated that it was working actively 
to address ACP concerns in a reaction to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. This 
seemingly new approach is interesting since this is a sign that the negotiations had not been 
proceeding as positively as the Commission had claimed all this time. Nevertheless, at the last 
stage of the negotiations, the Commission overtly used its market power by clearly stating what 
the deadline for concluding the negotiations was to ACP trade ministers. This shows that the 
Commission did not shy away from using its stronger position in the negotiations. At the same 
time, the Commission still reiterated that the EPAs were in the best interest of the ACP countries 
and would help ACP countries develop economically.  
The EP, on the other hand, was clearly in favour of a trade agreement based on genuine 
development and disapproved of uncontrolled trade liberalisation. The EP preferred to see the 
EU removing trade obstacles for ACP countries first, before asking those countries to open up 
their markets to the EU. The EP was critical about the negotiations and believed that it was 
important to research the effects of liberalisation before putting the EPAs in effect. It held the 
Commission accountable by asking it to ensure that the ACP countries would not be worse off 
after signing an EPA and that the EPAs would support regional integration instead of 
undermining it. It is clear that the EP did not avoid speaking about the difficulties arising from 
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the negotiations and shared the concerns of the ACP countries, in contrast to the Commission. 
In 2007, the EP stated that the Commission had not sufficiently taken the concerns of ACP 
countries into account and was clearly not afraid to publicly state that mistakes were made by 
the European side during the negotiations. At the same time, the EP was also critical about the 
ACP countries, because they had not been clear enough in what was missing regarding the 
development dimension of the EPAs. In the last year of the negotiations, however, the EP still 
tried to support the ACP countries by making sure that the deadline of ratification was extended.  
Concluding, we can state that the EP prioritised the concerns of the ACP countries 
during the negotiations and emphasised the need for development-oriented EPAs. The EP 
clearly challenged the arguments and negotiation tactics of the Commission, which shows that 
it did not agree with the course taken and intended to hold the Commission accountable. 
Moreover, it illustrates that the EP took on the task to represent not just EU citizens, but ACP 
citizens as well. The Commission, on the other hand, prioritised the opening up of ACP markets, 
which it claimed would lead to development, and the swift conclusion of the negotiations. The 
Commission avoided discussing the concerns raised by the ACP countries, tried to convince 
others of the positive atmosphere during the negotiations, and repeatedly claimed to only have 
the best interests at heart for ACP countries. 
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Appendix 
 
MEPs who give priority to the development dimension of the EPAs 
 
Margrietus van den Berg, on behalf of the PSE group (centre-left): 
“… the debate on the economic partnership agreements should not, in the first instance, be 
about acquiring free-trade agreements, but rather about concluding development contracts.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
David Martin, on behalf of the PSE group: 
“At times it has seemed as though development considerations have not been foremost in the 
Commission’s thinking on EPAs.” 
            (European Parliament 2007a) 
 
Alain Hutchinson, on behalf of the PSE group: 
“… is the Commission able to guarantee the ACP countries that, once signed, the agreements 
will provide them with development conditions that are more favourable than the ones from 
which they benefit today?  
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Marie-Arlette Carlotti, on behalf of the PSE group:  
“For them to become development agreements, we need to go much further… I believe that 
that is the price to be paid if the EPAs are to serve as a matter of priority the development of 
Africa, and not just that of Europe.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Kader Arif, on behalf of the PSE group: 
The aim is development, not reciprocity when it comes to opening up markets.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Fiona Hall, on behalf of the ALDE group (liberal-centrist): 
“… the January 2007 review of EPAs by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
was clear. This external and independent review concluded that there was a failure of the 
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negotiations to have a development focus and an excessive focus on trade liberalisation alone. 
Given this external UN assessment, I do not see how the Commission can keep on maintaining 
that the EPA negotiations have a positive dynamic and that everything is rosy.”  
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Sajjad Karim, on behalf of the ALDE group: 
“… I urge the Commissioner to demonstrate the Commission’s flexibility and commitment to 
the ACP’s concerns by undertaking a genuine exploration of development-oriented 
alternatives to EPAs…” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Carl Schlyter, on behalf of the Verts/ALE group (green/progressive): 
“Economic Partnership Agreements must exist to promote their development, not to increase 
our profits.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Bart Staes, on behalf of the Verts/ALE group:  
“This report is right to strike a critical note. It is of essence that the Commission should 
negotiate the EPAs with due consideration for the level of development of the ACP 
countries.” 
            (European Parliament 2007a) 
 
Pedro Guerreiro, on behalf of the GUE/NGL group (left/far left): 
“What is needed is an entirely different agenda, one that will promote effective cooperation, 
solidarity, independent development and social justice.” 
                          (European Parliament 2007a) 
 
Gabriele Zimmer, on behalf of the GUE/NGL group (left/far left): 
“I call on you, then, to suspend all negotiations on matters over and above customs tariffs and 
use your power to get the WTO reordered so as to take more account of the demands of 
development.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
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Jean-Pierre Audy, on behalf of the PPE-DE group (centre-right): 
“In line with the spirit of Cotonou, we need constantly to point out that the EPAs must not 
amount to mere free trade agreements, under the World Trade Organisation, but must represent 
a genuine partnership, making it possible to develop a new intervention framework that is 
conducive to the development of the ACP countries’ economies…” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
                                                     
MEPs who point to the Commission’s use of pressure 
 
Frithjof Schmidt, on behalf of the Verts/ALE group (green/progressive): 
“... negotiations are now entering upon a crucial stage, and they must not be allowed to fail, but 
it is also clear from what we are constantly told that the great pressure of time is proving too 
much for the weaker ones among our partner countries.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Carl Schlyter, on behalf of the Verts/ALE group: 
“We must not, therefore, engage in compulsion. If they do not wish to open up a market, we 
must not force them to do so.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Johan van Hecke, on behalf of the ALDE group (liberal-centrist): 
“… Mr Sturdy has written a balanced report which also accommodates the fair criticism voiced 
by the ACP partners to the effect that, during the negotiations, the EU does not listen enough 
to their complaints and is instead far too ready to impose things unilaterally.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
Fiona Hall, on behalf of the ALDE group: 
“The ACP countries insist that they are being put under pressure to negotiate on the 
Commission’s terms and they are particularly concerned that the Commission has failed to give 
time for proper impact assessments and has dismissed any assessments that were not in line 
with its own position. On the other hand, strangely, the Commission has maintained throughout 
that no one is complaining or asking for alternatives to EPAs.” 
(European Parliament 2007b) 
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Gabriele Zimmer, on behalf of the GUE/NGL group (left/far left): 
“I, for one, repudiate the idea of forcing our partner countries to accept conditions of the kind 
that the radical free market elements have not managed to get accepted even within the EU. No 
pretence is made that your regulations for public contracts are anything other than means 
towards the wedging open of the market; you may be putting two boxers in a ring, but one 
of them weighs 100 kg more than the other.” 
                      (European Parliament 2007b) 
 
MEPs who point to the EPAs as a threat for the ACP countries 
 
Kader Arif, on behalf of the PSE group: 
“Europe is perceived as seeking to impose at any price free trade areas on countries that 
are among the poorest in the world, and under its conditions. The relationship of trust with 
the ACP countries is now at stake.” 
               (European Parliament 2007b) 
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